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A SIMPLE TEST OF THE SHIRKING MODEL
Alan Manning and Jonathan Thomas
INTRODUCTION
Efficiency wage models have been regarded in certain circles as very
important for understanding why the labour market may not clear with
the consequence of  the existence of involuntary unemployment.  Yet,
there is incredibly little direct evidence for the existence let alone the
importance of efficiency wages.  Those studies which purport to offer
evidence for efficiency wages are generally unpersuasive.  Let us
consider some examples.
The most persuasive paper in many ways is Cappelli and Chauvin
(1991) who claim to test the main predictions of the shirking version of
efficiency wage theory proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  They
use a data set of UAW plants which all have the same wage package
and disciplinary procedure to test the hypothesis that there are fewer
dismissals for disciplinary reasons in plants located in low wage areas
(where the UAW job is more attractive relative to alternatives).  As they
summarise their findings “the wage premium appears to provide
incentives to avoid dismissal” (p784) and argue (p769) that this is “a
direct test of the main implications of the shirking efficiency wage
model”.  The problem is that this second claim does not follow from
the first.  Showing that incentives are important is not the same as
validating the main claims of the shirking efficiency wage theory,
namely that restrictions on the contracts that can be offered by firms
force employers to offer workers a level of utility strictly above what
they could get on the open labour market.  It is this issue of whether
employers have enough flexibility to design labour contracts which
simultaneously motivate workers and give them a level of utility equal
to what they could get on the open labour market that is really at the
heart of the debate about the relevance of the shirking model (see
2Lazear, 1981; Carmichael, 1985; Macleod and Malcomson, 1989,
1993; Akerlof and Katz, 1989 for different results with different
assumptions about the set of feasible incentive contracts).  Cappelli and
Chauvin (1991) do not test this as the incentive contract chosen is not
set unilaterally by employers but negotiated with the union so that it
is unsurprising that it is more generous than outside opportunities.  To
sum up, Cappelli and Chauvin does provide valuable evidence that
incentives are important but few would dispute that and it does not
prove the relevance of efficiency wage ideas. 
This problem pervades other proposed tests of efficiency wage
models.  For example there are a series of papers (Wadhwani and Wall,
1991; Levine, 1992; Konings and Walsh, 1994) arguing that the
distinctive feature of these models is that worker productivity is higher
when wages are high relative to alternatives and then look for evidence
of this either by the direct estimation of production functions or more
indirect means.  The problem is that this prediction is not a distinctive
feature of efficiency wage models: a competitive compensating wage
differentials model would have the same prediction as a firm that wants
to work its workers hard needs to pay a higher wage relative to
alternatives.  This point is made by Machin and Manning (1992) who
try to distinguish between competing models on the basis of dynamics:
this approach itself is very dependent on the theoretical model used.
In this literature the proponents of efficiency wages implicitly claim
that the idea that there is a disutility of effort proves the existence of
involuntary unemployment:  again, this is simply not true.
A third empirical literature that is often claimed as support for
efficiency wage models is that on inter-industry wage differentials
(Krueger and Summers, 1988) which finds evidence that wages are
systematically related to industry affiliation even when all other (or,
more accurately, all available) relevant factors are included in earnings
equations.  There is a considerable literature on whether these industry
effects actually exist (see Murphy and Topel, 1987; Gibbons and Katz,
1992; Keane, 1993) but even if they do it is obvious that the
3connection between industry effects and efficiency wage models is
tenuous at best.
At the end of all this perhaps the best evidence for efficiency
wage models are anecdotes eg the study of Henry Ford’s $5 day by Raff
and Summers (1987) and Weiss’ (1980) model built on the story of the
Stanford Linear Accelerator Laboratory.  But, it is obviously difficult
to generalise from case studies to the importance of efficiency wages in
the economy as a whole.
In this paper we propose a simple test of one prominent version
of the efficiency wage model, the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) which has the considerable merit, we believe, of focussing
directly on the issue of whether involuntary unemployment exists or
not.  This test is based on the following idea.  In traditional search
models workers have a reservation wage at which the value of
employment  at that wage  equals that of remaining unemployed.
Consequently, the distribution of accepted wages will be truncated
below by the reservation wage.  Now, suppose there is imperfect
monitoring which leads to a potential problem with workers shirking.
A key insight of this literature is that workers will shirk unless they
receive a wage which is sufficiently high to ensure that retaining the job
is better than losing it.  This means that an employer will not be
prepared to knowingly employ a worker at their reservation wage or
even slightly above it as they will then not have sufficient incentives
not to shirk.  The distribution of accepted wages will be truncated
below by the reservation wage plus something.  Establishing the
existence and size of that something is the basis of our test.
The plan of the paper is as follows.   In the next section, we
present a simple model to formalise the idea expressed above.  We then
describe our data which is drawn from the 1987/88 UK Survey of
Incomes In and Out of Work (SIIOW). The third section then modifies
the theoretical model to be suitable for empirical investigation and the
fourth  presents the results.  Our conclusions are that while there is
some evidence supportive of the importance of shirking, the evidence
is hardly over-whelming.
41. A THEORETICAL MODEL
 
In this section we present a simple theoretical model that combines
features of traditional search ideas and the shirking model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984).  Let the worker receive utility b when unemployed.
A worker faces a distribution function of wage offers F(w) which, for
convenience, we assume to be differentiable with density function f(w).
We are deliberately vague about where this wage distribution comes
from.  It could be from models of equilibrium wage dispersion in which
employers set wages or it could be the results of bargaining between
workers and firms where there is job-specific variation in productivity.
The bargaining case produces the same qualitative predictions as, in the
absence of incentive problems, a match will occur whenever there is a
surplus to be shared between workers and employer so that the lower
bound on the surplus in matches is zero and the workers will receive
their reservation wage in this case.  So, it does not really matter where
the wage distribution comes from for our purposes.   It is also important
to recognise that our model does not require there to be employers
offering wages below the reservation wage as the distribution of
accepted wages which we model will not depend on this.
Job offers are assumed to arrive at a rate ?0 for unemployed
workers and ?1 for employed workers.  Workers also leave employment
for unemployment at an exogenously given job destruction rate q and
have a discount rate equal to d.  If a worker accepts a wage w and does
not shirk then the instantaneous utility from the job is assumed to be
(w-e), while if they do shirk this utility is simply assumed to be w.  We
assume there is imperfect monitoring of workers; in particular that the
incidence of monitoring is a Poisson process with arrival rate ?.  Like
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) the punishment for shirking is to be fired.
Implicit in this set-up is that we also follow Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) in assuming that the employment contract is simply a fixed
wage.  There is, of course a considerable literature on why more
5d.V(w)'w&e&q.[V(w)&V u]%?1. m
max(w,w ()
[V(x)&V(w)]dF(x)
(1)
complicated contracts involving bonds or upward-sloping wage profiles
may be optimal to deter shirking (see, for example, Carmichael, 1985;
Macleod and Malcomson, 1989, 1993) and, as we have already
mentioned, the issue of the flexibility of labour contracts is crucial for
determining whether involuntary unemployment exists.  However, it is
hard for us to take full account of the undoubted complexities of real-
world employment contracts in our empirical work as our data set only
has information on a single starting wage and a single reservation wage.
This is not necessarily disastrous.  If all jobs have much the same
incentive structure (in terms of wage growth and bonuses etc) then one
can think of workers as having a reservation starting wage for jobs and
the issue of whether involuntary unemployment exists can be thought
of as whether the lowest acceptable starting wage for employers is or
is not strictly above the reservation wage for workers. So, if we find
that the lower bound for accepted wages is the reservation wage we
would prefer to interpret that as implying that other ways of providing
incentives work well rather than as evidence that there is no incentive
problem at all (which is what, strictly speaking, our theoretical model
implies).
Define V(w) to be the value to a worker of being employed in a
wage paying w if they do not shirk, Vs(w) to be the value of the job
when they do shirk and Vu to be the value of being unemployed.  Not
surprisingly, the worker will want any job that exceeds some
reservation wage r (to be derived below) and the firm will only want to
employ workers when they know that the worker will not shirk which
will require the wage to be above some critical level which we will
denote by w* (which is also derived below)1.  w* is the minimum wage
at which a worker will not shirk.  Then, the value functions must be
given by:
6d.V s(w)'w&(?%q).[V s(w)&V u]%?1. m
max(w,w()
[V(x)&V(w)]dF(x)
(2)
d.V u ' b % ?0. m
max(r,w ()
[V(x)&V u]dF(x)
(3)
V )(w) ' 1
d%q%?1.[1&F(max(w,w
())]
> 1
d%q%?%?1.[1&F(max(w,w
())]
'V s
)
(w)
(4)
V(w() ' V u % e
?
(5)
In these equations we allow for the possibility that a worker is
employed at a wage below w* in order to derive the no-shirking
condition although, in equilibrium, this will never happen.  By
differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to w we have that:
so that V(w)-Vs(w) is increasing in the wage so that the no-shirking
condition will a be a cut-off rule of the form we have assumed ie that
w$w* where V(w*)=Vs(w*).  Using (1) and (2) this condition can be
written as:
7(5) is a familiar type of no-shirking condition as it says that the utility
the worker gets from the job must be strictly larger than the utility
available when unemployed.  As ?64 and monitoring becomes perfect
the premium that needs to be paid to workers to prevent them from
shirking goes to zero.  (5) also implies that w* must be above the
reservation wage of workers as the reservation wage will be the wage
at which the value of the job is equal to the value of being unemployed.
So, in (3), max(r,w*)=w*.
It is instructive to write the no-shirking condition in terms of the
wage distribution rather than the value functions. Integrating the final
term in (1)-(3) by parts, and using the first part of (4), we can derive:
8d.V(w) ' w&e&q.[V(w)&V u] % ?1.m
w (
[1&F(x)]dx
d%q%?1[1&F(x)]
(6)
d.V u'b%?0.[V(w
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w(
[1&F(x)]dx
d%q%?1[1&F(x)]
(8)
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(7)
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d%q%?0.[1&F(w
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?
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[1&F(x)]dx
d%q%?1.[1&F(x)]
(9)
Evaluating (6) at w* and using (8) and (5) allows us to write the no-
shirking condition as:
It is simple to check that there must be a unique w* that solves (9).  (9)
 is easy to understand.  Workers must be offered a wage that exceeds
the utility they can receive when unemployed and the disutility of
effort associated with working.  If job offer arrival rates differ by
employment status they must also receive compensation for the
difference in the value of search when employed and unemployed:  this
is the last term in (9).  Finally there must be a sufficient gap between
the value of the job when employed and unemployed to ensure that the
worker does not shirk; this is given by the penultimate term.
Let us now consider the reservation wage of the worker.  There
is an ambiguity here according to whether we compute the reservation
wage assuming that the worker does or does not shirk.  We know that
9r ' b % (?0&?1).m
w (
[1&F(x)]dx
d%q%?1.[1&F(x)]
(10)
w( ' r % e %
d%q%?0.[1&F(w
()]
?
.e (11)
the reservation wage will be below w* and that such a worker will
shirk.  So, it seems natural to define the reservation wage assuming the
worker will shirk ie r is given by the solution to Vs(r)=Vu.  Using (7)
and (8) we have that:
Substituting this back into (9) gives us:
(11) shows that with shirking, the minimum wage at which employers
will be prepared to employ workers is the reservation wage plus
something positive.  One problem with (11) is that this result seems to
hold even when monitoring becomes perfect.  The problem here is that
there is a discontinuity in the model with perfect monitoring as then a
worker will not shirk even at their reservation wage2.  Denote by r1 the
reservation wage if workers do not shirk ie r1 solves V(r1)=Vu.  From (6)
and (8) it is straightforward to see that r1=r+e.  Using this reservation
wage for the case of perfect monitoring we can see that the minimum
wage acceptable to employers is then the same as the reservation wage.
The prediction we have derived so far is that if shirking is
important, then the distribution of accepted wages should be truncated
below by the reservation wage plus a little something extra.  But, we
can also derive stronger predictions.
First, note that ?0(1-F(w*)) is the exit rate from unemployment.
(11) says that the something will be larger, the higher is the exit rate
from unemployment.  This is not surprising, as the threat of being fired
for shirking is less severe when it is relatively easy to find another job.
 So, in labour markets with high unemployment we might expect the
‘something’ to be smaller.
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Secondly an increase in q, the rate at which workers leave
employment for non-employment, tends to raise the ‘something’ as
workers’ expected job duration is shorter when q is higher.  As women
leave employment for non-employment at a faster rate than men
(because of domestic reasons) and because lay-off rates are higher for
less educated workers this delivers the prediction that we would expect
the ‘something’ to be higher for women and less educated workers. 
In this section we have presented a traditional search model
augmented with shirking problems to show how these will cause the
distribution of accepted wages to be truncated below not by the
reservation wage but by the reservation wage plus something.  That
something is a measure of the importance of shirking and is also
predicted to be larger for workers with low exit rates from
unemployment and high rates of job loss.  We now consider whether
there is any evidence for these predictions.
2. THE DATA AND A FIRST ANALYSIS
The data for this study comes from the SIIOW which is based upon  a
nationally representative sample of 3003 men and women who started
a spell of unemployment (by signing-on) in March or April 1987.  This
period witnessed the onset of a very fast boom.  The unemployment
rate had peaked at about 12% in early 1986, had fallen to 11.3% by
March 1987 and then, over the period of study, fell continuously to
9.6% by November 1987.  Individuals were interviewed twice, once
within around 6-8 weeks of signing-on and again approximately nine
months later.  Information from these surveys was supplemented by
information from the administrative records of the Department of
Health and Social Security (DHSS).  The aim of the survey was to
examine the relationship between incomes in and out of work, and their
effects on job search and unemployment durations.  To this end, the
interviews asked a large number of questions about search behaviour
and the process of the return to work.
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For our purposes, we need information on the reservation wage
and the wage in the return to work (RTW) job.  The information on the
reservation wage comes from the question “what is the lowest weekly
take-home pay you might consider accepting” which was supplemented
by a question on hours. This was converted to an hourly wage.  Not all
the sample provided useable information on the reservation wage:  211
said they had never looked for work and of those who had, 632
provided no reservation wage information, leaving a sample of 2,160
for whom we do have a measure of the reservation wage.
The wage in the RTW job was derived from a question on the
usual take-home pay in the first job after signing-on.  The answer to
this question was converted to an hourly wage.  378  of the workers
with a reservation wage never returned to work in the approximately
nine months to the second interview so obviously no wage is available
for them (we discuss potential problems caused by this sample
selection later).  Among the 1,782 workers who did return to work, we
have information on the wage for 885 of them which is approximately
50% of the total population3.  Our basic sample consists of these 885
workers.  Some summary statistics about this sample are presented in
Table 1 as well as a comparison of all those with reservation wage
information who left unemployment for a job.  The two samples are
similar except that those providing information on the wage tend to
have shorter durations.  This is because they are more likely to have
been in employment at the first interview (and hence provide
information on the RTW wage at that time) whereas those with longer
durations could only have provided information about the RTW wages
at the second interview when there was considerable attrition.  One
noteworthy fact, which will be of importance later, is that the gap
between average reservation wages and realised wages is very small.
Figure 1 presents a simple plot of realised wages against reported
reservation wages.  If the model presented in the previous section was
correct, one would have a very simple estimate of the lowest value of
the something:  it would be the smallest observed gap between realised
wages and reservation wages4.  This estimator would be super-
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consistent (by a straightforward application of Christensen and Kiefer,
1991).  But, there is an obvious problem with this procedure, for
realised wages are sometimes observed to lie below reservation wages.
This is inconsistent with the standard search model without shirking in
which the realised wages are truncated below by reservation wages.  A
usable empirical model must allow for this fact.
One concern might be that the problem of Figure 1 is caused by
the fact that reported reservation wages are meaningless and do not
play the role they are given in the theoretical model. According to the
theory,  other things equal, higher reservation wages should be
associated with higher realised wages and longer durations of
unemployment.  So, we would like to know whether both of these
propositions are true.  
From Figure 1, there is a very noticeable positive correlation
between realised and reservation wages.  Table 2 investigates how
robust this conclusion is to the inclusion of other control variables.  In
the first column we regress log wages on a variety of characteristics
normally included in earnings equations.  A familiar picture emerges:
wages are positively related to education, being male, white and in
good health and a concave function of age.  The second column
includes the reservation wage.  What is striking is not just the fact that
the reservation wage is very significant but that other variables are
much less significant.  In particular, age now has no effect suggesting
that the higher wages realised by older workers are a consequence only
of their higher reservation wage.  The third column also includes the
duration of unemployment  which has a very small effect on wages
consistent with the growth in nominal wages over the sample period.
One concern might be that the reservation wage picks up
unobserved heterogeneity in worker quality so that high reservation
wages are associated with high realised wages through the position of
the wage offer distribution rather than the truncation that our theory
suggests.  But, by looking at how durations are related to reservation
wages, we can see whether this is the dominant effect as we would
expect a high quality worker to have both a higher reservation wage
13
and a duration that is shorter than a low quality worker.  The observed
correlation between unemployment duration and reservation wages
would be negative.  On the other hand, if the variation in the
reservation wage is associated with variation in the truncation point of
a given wage offer distribution then we would expect a positive
correlation.  Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of various
parametric and semi-parametric duration models: an exponential, a
Weibull and a Cox.  A positive coefficient on a variable indicates that
it is positively correlated with duration.  In addition to the variables
included so far, we include the local unemployment rate and measures
of the time and money spent on job search and whether the worker has
access to private motorised transport.  In all the specifications a high
reservation wage is associated with higher durations suggesting that, on
average, variation in the reservation wage is working in the way
suggested by our model.
We now turn to the issue of how we can present an empirical
model that can explain the problem posed in Figure 1.
 
3. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL
There are a number of ways in which we might modify the theoretical
model of the first section to make it consistent with the data presented
in Figure 1.  The approach we adopt here is to assume that the utility
derived from jobs is determined not just by the wage but also by some
non-monetary characteristics eg convenient hours, congenial working
conditions, distance from home etc.  Evidence in support of this idea
can be found in Blau (1991) and Altonji and Paxson (1992).  When
individuals are asked for their reservation wage they cannot qualify
their answer by saying that it would be £3 per hour in one job, £3.50
per hour in another.  The assumption we make here is that the answer
they give is based on the average job.  This is our identifying
assumption and, because of this, it is not testable.
14
f(w*r) '
1
s w
.f w&µ
s w
. 1&F r%a&w
s v
1&F r%a&µ
s 1
(12)
To make this idea more precise, assume that the utility to be
derived from the job can be written as u=w+v where w is the log of the
wage and v is some non-monetary component to the utility from the
job.  v is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
variance s 2v, and w is assumed to be normally distributed with mean µ
(which will be allowed to vary with personal characteristics) and
variance s 2w.  For the moment, assume that w and v are independently
distributed.  We assume that the individual wants the job if u>r where
r is the log of the reservation wage, but that the employer only wants
to employ the worker if u>(r+a) where a>0 and is a measure of the
importance of shirking.
Consider what will be the observed distribution of wages
conditional on reservation wages in this model which we will denote
by f(w*r).  First, consider what is the probability of getting a job offer
that is acceptable to both parties.  This is the probability that
(w+v)>(r+a) as (r+a) is the truncation point.  Given our assumptions,
(w+v) is normally distributed with mean µ and variance s 21=(s 2w+s 2v).
So the probability of getting an acceptable job offer is [1-F ((r+a-
µ)/s 1)].  The probability of getting an offer w that is acceptable is the
probability of getting w times the probability of getting a value of v
such that v>(r+a-w), which is given by [1-F ((r+a-w)/s v)].  So the
density of observed wages conditional on reservation wages will be
given by:
This is the individual contribution to the likelihood function.
The alternative approach to rationalising Figure 1 would be to
assume that the observed wage contains some measurement error but
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that the true wage is always above the true reservation wage:  this is the
approach taken by Christensen and Kiefer (1994).  To see the
implications of this suppose that the true wage is u but the observed
wage is w and w=u+v where v is mean zero and uncorrelated with u.
Decisions to take on workers will be based on a comparison of u with
(r+a).  This model can be put in our framework by noting that we can
write u=w-v which is the model presented above but with the
generalisation that now w and v can be correlated.  In fact, they must
have a negative correlation.  We tried to estimate this model but our
estimates always went to edge of the parameter space in which v was
uncorrelated with w (although it should be noted that the likelihood
function does seem to be very flat).  For this reason we stick to our first
model.
A brief discussion of identification is in order here.  The
likelihood function in (12) is essentially the distribution of w
conditional on utility being bigger than (r+a) so that we are interested
in estimating the parameter a in a density function of the form
f(w*u>r+a).  Without further structure it should be obvious that one
cannot estimate a in general (ie it is non-parametrically unidentified)5.
Our assumption that the reservation wage is determined by workers
thinking about the average job implies that E(u*w)=w.  But, this type
of assumption is still not enough to identify a in a non-parametric sense
because the distribution we are estimating is a truncated one and there
is going to be no information in our data about the part of the
distribution that is not observed.  Given this we see little alternative to
using a specific functional form to achieve identification, in which case
one should be aware of the possibility that results are driven by
inappropriate assumptions about functional form.  With this in mind,
we present tests of the adequacy of the functional form chosen.
     
4. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Basic Results
16
d '
1&F r&µ
s 1
1&F r%a&µ
s 1
(13)
Table 4 presents the results of estimation of the likelihood function in
(12).  In the first column we report the results for the whole sample
including all the variables that we would expect in earnings functions.
From our point of view, the important estimate is that of a which is
estimated to be 16% with an asymptotic t-statistic of 1.88.  In terms of
the shirking model, it is obviously of the right sign but lies on the
margin of conventional levels of significance.  We would also like some
idea of whether this estimate is large or small.  One way of assessing the
importance of this estimate is to compute its effect on the exit rate from
unemployment.  Ideally, one would like to compare the situation with
and without problems caused by shirking.  The problem is that there is
reason to believe that the whole structure of the economy would be
different if there was no shirking.  For example, we might expect there
to be more but lower wage jobs so that the wage offer distribution and
the job arrival rate would be different.  In turn, this would have an
effect on the reservation wage.  There is obviously no way that these
general equilibrium effects can be estimated.  Nevertheless, to give
some general idea of the importance of shirking we assumed that the
wage offer distribution, reservation wage and job offer arrival rates are
the same with and without shirking problems.  The proportional
increase in unemployment duration caused by shirking is then given by:
The average value of this measure is reported in the row marked d.  For
the first column of Table 1, the average value of d is 1.72 implying that
unemployment durations are 72% higher in the presence of shirking
(subject to the provisos made above).  This effect seems large given that
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the estimate of a seems small, but comes about because the gap
between the realised and reservation wages is not large so that small
variation in a can have big effects.  However, the standard error is also
extremely large so that d is not significantly different from one.  The
problem is that we have very large point estimates of d but very large
standard errors means that one can rarely reject the null hypothesis that
unemployment durations are no different from what they would be in
the absence of shirking. 
  As discussed above, one other concern might be that our results
are very sensitive to functional form, the choice of which has been
dictated primarily by analytical convenience.  To allay some of these
fears we present a series of specification tests.  First, to see whether the
model fits the data reasonably well we use the test proposed by Vuong
(1989) to test our functional form against the linear regression model
in which the log of the wage is regressed on all the explanatory
variables in the model and the log of the reservation wage (essentially
this is the model of the second column of Table 2).  A positive test
statistic indicates that our model does better than this crude alternative.
As the test statistic has an asymptotic standard normal distribution one
can see that the model in column 1 of Table 4 is nearly significantly
better than the crude alternative.
As a further test of the adequacy of our functional form we also
present a test statistic based on the approach proposed by Heckman
(1984).  Given our parameter estimates, we compute for each individual
the probability of observing a log wage below the mean log wage given
their characteristics.  We then take the sample average of this
probability and test whether it is significantly different from the actual
sample proportion with a log wage below the mean (which is close to
0.5 in our sample).  We report the difference between the actual and
predicted proportions and also report the asymptotic standard error.
While we reject the null hypothesis that the functional form is
acceptable for the specifications with men and women together, we
always accept the null hypothesis for separate male and female
equations.
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The second column deletes those variables from the wage offer
distribution that are not significant.  The estimate of a rises to about
17% and is now just statistically significant at the 5% level.
We now move on to try to test some of the more specific
predictions of the shirking model.  We suggested above that the
estimates for a should be larger for women than men because women
leave employment for non-employment at a faster rate.  The third and
fourth columns estimate separate equations for men and women.  It is
clear that there is no effect whatsoever for women and any effect that
does exist is for men.  For men alone a is estimated at 34% and the
implied reduction in unemployment durations is of the order of 238%
although, again, the estimate is not significantly different from one.
These results are not in line with the predictions of the shirking model.
The fifth column reports the results when the variables determining the
mean of the wage offer distribution are restricted.   
Table 5 extends this examination of the importance of shirking for
men, testing the hypothesis that a should be larger for less skilled
workers (because they have higher lay-off rates) by allowing a to
depend on whether the individual has higher education.  The results are
reported in the first column.  Although the point estimate is in line with
the predictions of the shirking model it is insignificant. 
The second column of Table 5 also investigates the possibility
that the local unemployment rate affects a through its effect on the exit
rate from unemployment.  Given the evidence amassed by
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995), it is probably unwise to control for
the unemployment rate without also controlling for the mean of the
wage offer distribution. This is the approach of the second column and
there is no evidence that high unemployment rates are associated with
less problems of shirking: if anything, the reverse seems to be the case
although once again a zero effect cannot be rejected. 
Given all this, the performance of the shirking model is rather
weak.  It certainly does not seem to be a phenomenon which is so
important that one could not deny its existence with any credibility.
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However, its performance is not completely disastrous and one could
make a case that it does have a modest impact on the labour market.
Additional Tests
a. sample selection issues
The main potential for sample selection bias arises from the fact that we
only observe realised wages for those with completed durations.  There
are a number of reasons for thinking that this may lead to a bias in the
estimate of a but no definitive conclusion about the direction of the
bias is possible.  For example, suppose there is individual heterogeneity
in the arrival rate of job offers when unemployed.  Then, as (11) shows,
we would expect a to be increasing in the exit rate from unemployment
so that our sample which focuses on individuals with relatively short
durations also focuses on those with high a.  Then, our estimates will
over-estimate the importance of shirking.  But if the individual
heterogeneity was in ? so that some individuals are better at shirking
than others then the bias would be in the other direction as high ?
individuals will tend to have high a and long unemployment durations
(as it takes them longer to find a job with a wage above their w*).  One
might also think that there are efficiency gains to be obtained by
estimating a model of the joint density of durations and realised wages.
This model would have to contain extra parameters related to the job
offer arrival rate.  As there is no particular reason to exclude any
variables from the determinants of the job offer arrival rate, one can
think of the parameters of the realised wage offer distribution as being
essentially independent of those of the duration model.  There is then
no real efficiency loss from not modelling durations.  
b. changing wage distributions and reservation wages
There is also a potential problem with the fact that the reservation wage
information we have used only relates to a single point in time near the
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beginning of the spell and cannot pick up any changes over time.  For
example, if the wage offer distribution is constant but reservation wages
fall over time then we will expect to see spuriously low realised wages
which will tend to lead to a downward bias in the estimate of the
importance of shirking.  On the other hand, if the wage offer
distribution is shifting up over time because of inflation or real wage
growth but reservation wages were constant then there would be an
upward bias in the estimate of the return to shirking.
We have a number of ways of looking for the importance of this
effect.  First, for those workers who were not in work at the second
interview, we have a second observation on the reservation wage.  The
relationship between these two reservation wages is shown in Figure 2.
On average the reservation wage at the second interview is about 2%
higher than that at the first interview.  This corresponds to reservation
wages increasing in line with prices.  The problem with this information
is that it may be contaminated by severe sample selection bias:  it may
be precisely those workers who refuse to lower their reservation wage
who do not manage to get into jobs.
A second way of investigating the effect of changing wage offer
distributions and reservation wages is to assume that the mean of the
wage offer distribution changes with duration and that the reservation
wage also changes with duration.  So, in the specification of (r+a) we
include a term that is linear in the spell.  The results of this are
presented in the third column of Table 5. One could also think of this
as being a test of the direction of the potential bias discussed in the
previous section.  The spot estimates imply that the mean of the wage
offer distribution is increasing with duration presumably because
inflation and real wage growth are more than off-setting any
deterioration in the human capital of the long-term unemployed.  The
estimates of the effect of duration on the reservation wage imply that
the reservation wage decreases with duration which is probably what
we would expect.  However, the spot estimates of these effects are
much too large to be plausible as annual inflation was about 4% in this
period and annual nominal average wage growth was about 7%,
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something which is reflected in the large standard errors.  But the
intercept in a, which is our measure of the importance of shirking,
remains much the same.  The final column of Table 5 restricts the effect
of the spell on the mean of the wage offer distribution to be in line with
what we would expect nominal wage growth to be for these workers ie
about 4% per annum.  This makes little difference to the estimate of a.
c. unobservable reservation wages
The model we have presented above assumed that employers could
observe the reservation wage of workers when offering a job.  If they
are not able to do this they will sometimes employ workers who they
think will not shirk but actually will and sometimes refuse employment
to those who would not have shirked.  One way of testing whether this
is important is to look at the subsequent job history of those who are
hired at wages that are low in relation to reservation wages.  If this
effect is important we would expect to see higher dismissal rates for
workers whose wages are low relative to reservation wages.  For the
jobs in our sample, Table 6 summarises the fraction that we have
information on having ended and the reasons given for the job ending.
A considerable fraction (over 40%) of the RTW jobs had ended within
the sample period.  But, dismissal was the reason cited by only a very
small minority (4%) of those leaving the RTW job.  Taken at face value
this implies either that employers are well able to identify at the hiring
stage who will shirk and who will not or that dismissal is not a widely
used threat for motivating workers.  But there is a problem with this
rather glib conclusion as there are good reasons for thinking that  some
of the job endings classified in other categories were really dismissals6.
First, individuals may have an understandable reticence in admitting to
the interviewer that they had been dismissed for being a ‘bad’ worker.
Secondly, workers who are dismissed are potentially denied access to
benefits (as are those who voluntarily quit) so that employers may be
prepared to ‘sweeten the pill’ and give some other reason for the
worker leaving the firm.  Finally, the failure of the employer to renew
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a contract may be because the employer has not performed to a
satisfactory standard and the ending of a short-term contract does not
expose the employer to risks of being sued under unfair dismissal
legislation.  Given this, we propose to consider whether there is any
link between wages, reservation wages, jobs ending and the  reason
given.  We start by considering  a simple logit model for whether the
job has ended or not.  The results are reported in Table 7.  We include
the  usual set of personal characteristics as well as dummy variables for
when the return to work job was found.  For someone with a RTW job
it may be the case that they had the job by the first interview.  These
people have obviously had longer to have left the first job
(unfortunately we lack exact information on job tenure) and we will
have had more opportunity to observe the worker leaving the job if
there is a second interview.  Accordingly we include in the regression
a dummy variable for those workers who had returned to work by the
first interview and another dummy variable for whether there was a
second interview.  The excluded category is those who had not had a
job by the date of the first interview but who had had one by the
second interview (which must have occurred for this group to have
made it into the sample).
From the first column of Table 7 these variables are very
important.  In terms of the effect of the wage and reservation wage, we
can see that the wage has the expected negative effect and the
reservation wage the expected positive effect though the reservation is
wage is not significantly different from zero and the wage is only
significant at the 10% level.  The second column then excluded the
other variables that seem to be unimportant in explaining whether the
worker leaves or not. The coefficient on the reservation wage is
resolutely insignificant.  The wage effect could conceivably be argued
to be supportive of the shirking model but we would prefer not to give
this interpretation as it is well-known that high wage workers have a
lower risk of job loss and are less likely to quit (so perhaps the turnover
version of efficiency wages is more relevant).  We think that the
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coefficient on the reservation wage is the cleanest test of the shirking
model and our results are not consistent with it.
We now turn to see whether there is any significant difference in
the effect of wages and reservation wages on the probability of leaving
for particular reasons.  Table 8 presents the results from  a  multinomial
logit model in which the default category is those who have not left
their job.  To improve the sample sizes in the different categories we
group together the laid-off categories and the other and not stated.  The
significantly negative effect of the wage can be seen to be mostly the
result of the negative effect on the chances of quitting.  Similarly, the
effect of the reservation wage (always insignificant) is not more
important for the dismissals and contracts ending.  We conclude that
this job-ending data is not consistent with the view that employers have
substantial difficulty in identifying potential shirkers as the chances of
being dismissed seem very small and are not related to reservation
wages in the way predicted by the theory.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Efficiency wage models have been surprisingly resistant to empirical
testing in spite of their potential theoretical importance.  In this paper
we have presented a simple test for the empirical relevance of the
shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) which, compared to other
studies, has the virtue of focusing directly on seeing whether there is
any evidence for involuntary unemployment ie workers being unable
to get jobs at wages they would be prepared to accept.  Our empirical
findings have been mixed but overall do not suggest that the shirking
model is of great importance in the labour market.  This should not be
interpreted as saying that there is no problem with motivating workers,
rather that employers have other ways of dealing with these problems
apart from paying wages above the reservation wage and dismissing
workers caught shirking.  
We have also only provided a test of the shirking version and
there are other popular versions (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).  We
think this is a virtue:  very different theories are lumped together under
the title of efficiency wage models and this only hinders detailed
empirical testing of them.
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1. It is simple to prove that the equilibrium cut-off rule must be of
this form (see (4) above) but allowing for a general hiring rule at this
stage introduces tedious additional notation which only complicates
the presentation.
2. This discontinuity arises because of the discrete nature of the
effort choice in the present model and would disappear in a richer (but
more complicated) model with continuous effort choices.
3. One reason this proportion is low is that the information on the
unemployment spell comes from administrative records which were
examined for a year whereas the latest information on employment
comes from the second interview conducted at approximately nine
months.
4. It should be noted that if there is any heterogeneity in the
something then this estimator cannot be used to estimate the average
value.  However, this literature often assumes that the reservation wages
are constant across subsets of individuals so the assumption of a
constant something is also in that spirit.
5. For example, one obviously could not estimate a if w and u were
independent.  This is not something to concern us too much here as
there is good reason to believe that utility and wages are positively
correlated.
6. It is worth noting here that, if shirking is important, there is a
meaningful economic distinction between quits and lay-offs as, in the
latter case, the worker is forced out involuntarily this being the
equivalent situation to the involuntary unemployment faced by an
unemployed worker.
ENDNOTES
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TABLE 1
Summary of the Data
Sample with
Observed Wages
(885 observations)
 Sample with
Completed Durations
(1736 observations)
Variable Mean Std
Deviation
Mean Std
Deviation
wage 2.55 1.26    
res wage 2.27 0.85 2.37 1.09
exp wage 2.66 1.03 2.77 1.26
age 36.3 11.1 36.6 11.4
male 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49
white 0.93 0.25 0.92 0.27
health probs 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48
higher ed 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42
tech qual 0.43 0.49 0.40 0.49
school qual 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50
spell 75.3 76.3 101.7 92.3
search time 
(hours/week)
9.0 7.5 8.5 7.3
search
expenditure
(£/week)
4.81 4.41 4.67 4.43
wheels 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50
local u rate 13.8 4.5 13.6 4.4
TABLE 2
Wage Regressions
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage in RTW Job
1 2 3
constant -0.27
(0.15)
0.16
(0.13)
0.15
(0.12)
male 0.21
(0.02)
0.070
(0.023)
0.069
(0.022)
age 0.043
(0.008)
0.005
(0.007)
0.005
(0.006)
age sq /100 -0.048
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.009)
-0.005
(0.008)
white 0.081
(0.041)
0.087
(0.035)
0.089
(0.043)
health probs -0.051
(0.026)
-0.037
(0.023)
-0.037
(0.022)
higher ed 0.11
(0.035)
0.081
(0.030)
0.081
(0.027)
tech qual 0.078
(0.025)
0.018
(0.023)
0.018
(0.022)
sc qual 0.027
(0.030)
-0.023
(0.025)
-0.023
(0.025)
ln(res wage) 0.61
(0.05)
0.61
(0.04)
spell (yrs) 0.024
(0.050)
No. of obs 885 885 885
R-squared 0.35 0.37 0.37
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 3
Estimated Duration Models
Exponential Weibull Cox
constant 6.27
(0.29)
6.32
(0.35)
male 0.11
(0.06)
0.13
(0.07)
0.11
(0.06)
age -0.046
(0.014)
-0.050
(0.018)
-0.039
(0.015)
age sq /100 0.062
(0.018)
0.067
(0.022)
0.053
(0.018)
white -0.343
(0.095)
-0.371
(0.116)
-0.299
(0.095)
health probs 0.041
(0.052)
0.044
(0.063)
0.035
(0.052)
higher ed -0.13
(0.06)
-0.13
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.06)
tech qual -0.32
(0.05)
-0.34
(0.07)
-0.28
(0.05)
sc qual -0.041
(0.059)
-0.053
(0.072)
-0.043
(0.059)
ln(res wage) 0.28
(0.09)
0.31
(0.10)
0.24
(0.09)
search time -0.021
(0.004)
-0.023
(0.005)
-0.019
(0.004)
search expenditure -0.028
(0.007)
-0.031
(0.009)
-0.025
(0.007)
wheels -0.26
(0.05)
-0.29
(0.07)
-0.23
(0.05)
local u rate 0.017
(0.006)
0.019
(0.007)
0.015
(0.006)
sigma 1.22
(0.025)
No. of obs 2036 2036 2036
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 4
Estimates of Basic Shirking Model 
all all women men men
µ: const -0.61
(0.32)
-0.54
(0.23)
-0.23
(0.42)
-0.70
(0.46)
-0.79
(0.41)
µ; male  0.17
(0.06)
0.18
(0.06)
µ: age 0.012
(0.016)
0.019
(0.024)
0.011
(0.021)
µ: age sq/100 -0.012
(0.021)
-0.023
(0.033)
-0.010
(0.027)
µ: white 0.24
(0.12)
0.29
(0.13)
-0.048
(0.17)
0.36
(0.16)
0.47
(0.17)
µ: health
prob
-0.096
(0.060)
-0.078
(0.063)
-0.004
(0.082)
-0.15
(0.08)
-0.14
(0.09)
µ: higher ed 0.22
(0.07)
0.20
(0.07)
0.19
(0.10)
0.21
(0.10)
0.19
(0.10)
µ: tech qual 0.045
(0.059)
-0.065
(0.091)
0.077
(0.077)
µ: sc qual -0.076
(0.069)
0.072
(0.102)
-0.136
(0.09)
s w  0.49
(0.02)
0.51
(0.02)
0.44
(0.03)
0.57
(0.03)
0.55
(0.03)
s v 0.29
(0.01)
0.29 
(0.01)
0.20
(0.02)
0.34
(0.02)
0.34
(0.02)
a 0.16
(0.085)
0.18
(0.084)
-0.057
(0.058)
0.34
(0.184)
0.37
(0.18)
No. of obs 885 885 353 532 532
logl -186.6 -188.7 -18.0 -148.5 -151.5
d 1.72
(0.64)
1.88
(0.68)
0.84
(0.18)
3.38
(3.19)
4.20
(4.05)
VUONG 1.68 1.68 2.22 0.87 0.85
HECKMAN 0.048
(0.015)
0.046
(0.015)
0.036
(0.023)
0.035
(0.019)
0.033
(0.020)
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Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 5
Further Estimates of Shirking Model for Men 
1 2 3 4
µ: const -1.57
(1.15)
-2.21
(2.37)
-0.79
(0.42)
-0.74
(0.40)
µ: white 0.46
(0.17)
0.41
(0.17)
0.44
(0.17)
0.44
(0.17)
µ: health -0.15
(0.10)
-0.13
(0.09)
-0.13
(0.09)
-0.13
(0.09)
µ: higher ed 1.51
(1.08)
0.19
(0.10)
0.18
(0.10)
0.18
(0.10)
µ: spell 0.40
(0.72)
0.04
µ: urate -0.66
(0.98)
s w 0.55
(0.03)
0.55
(0.03)
0.54
(0.03)
0.54
(0.03)
s v 0.34
(0.02)
0.34
(0.02)
0.33
(0.02)
0.33
(0.02
a: const 0.77
(0.59)
1.35
(1.26)
0.40
(0.19)
0.37
(0.17)
a: higher ed -0.74
(0.55)
a: spell -0.35
(0.39)
-0.15
(0.10)
a: urate 0.44
(0.51)
No. of obs 532 532 532 532
logl -147.7 -150.1 -150.7 -150.8
d 22.9
(76.9)
5.15
(6.44)
3.43
(3.05)
3.69
(3.58)
VUONG 1.30 0.92 0.91 0.98
HECKMAN 0.034
(0.019)
0.034
(0.020)
0.033
(0.020)
0.033
(0.019)
   Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 6
The Ending of RTW Jobs
number of jobs % of jobs % of ended jobs
not ended 506 57.2
firm closure 7 0.8 2.0
laid-off 52 5.9 12.1
dismissed 14 1.6 4.1
quit 99 11.2 26.9
end of contract 172 19.4 42.9
ill health, pregnant 8 0.9 2.3
other reason 22 2.5 7.3
not stated 5 0.6 2.3
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TABLE 7
Logit Model for the Probability of a Job Ending
Dependent Variable: RTW Job Ended Within the Sample
Period
1 2
constant 0.10
(0.82)
-0.55
(0.22)
male -0.03
(0.16)
age -0.07
(0.04)
age sq /100 0.086
(0.056)
white 0.45
(0.31)
health probs 0.44
(0.15)
0.41
(0.15)
higher ed 0.23
(0.19)
tech qual 0.30
(0.15)
0.37
(0.15)
sc qual 0.09
(0.17)
ln(res wage) 0.24
(0.29)
0.08
(0.26)
ln(wage) -0.41
(0.24)
-0.37
(0.23)
in job by first interview
and second interview
0.79
(0.15)
0.81
(0.15)
in job by first interview
but no second interview
-0.91
(0.24)
-0.86
(0.24)
Log-Likelihood -560.2 -563.8
No. of obs 885 885
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Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 8
Multinomial Logit Model for Ending of RTW Job
Default Category: RTW Job Has Not Ended in Sample Period
category laid-off / 
firm
closed
dis-
missed
quit contract
ended
health / 
pregnancy
other / 
not
stated
constant -4.15
(1.79)
-18.64
(.)
-1.26
(1.31)
-1.13
(1.07)
-15.00
(.)
-1.61
(2.43)
male 0.43
(0.33)
0.52
(0.66)
0.031
(0.25)
-0.20
(0.20)
-0.78
(0.80)
-0.17
(0.46)
age 0.029
(0.090)
-0.30
(0.14)
-0.017
(0.073)
-0.060
(0.055)
-0.45
(0.20)
-0.021
(0.13)
age sq /100 -0.012
(0.11)
0.39
(0.17)
-0.008
(0.099)
0.090
(0.070)
0.51
(0.25)
-0.026
(0.18)
white 0.17
(0.64)
19.28
(2.59)
0.55
(0.51)
0.35
(0.40)
18.75
(3.23)
1.35
(0.44)
health probs 0.27
(0.30)
1.16
(0.59)
0.33
(0.25)
0.29
(0.20)
1.62
(0.81)
1.35
(0.44)
higher ed -0.67
(0.43)
0.91
(0.72)
-0.07
(0.30)
0.48
(0.23)
0.79
(1.00)
0.88
(0.57)
tech qual 0.47
(0.30)
-0.68
(0.66)
0.49
(0.25)
0.30
(0.20)
-0.066
(0.85)
-0.28
(0.49)
sc qual 0.36
(0.34)
0.018
(0.72)
0.29
(0.28)
0.10
(0.23)
-1.13
(0.99)
-1.24
(0.57)
ln(res wage) -0.27
(0.58)
0.53
(1.14)
0.34
(0.48)
0.036
(0.37)
3.04
(1.54)
1.41
(0.90)
ln(wage) 0.15
(0.47)
-0.44
(0.84)
-1.43
(0.41)
0.15
(0.30)
-2.24
(1.19)
-1.90
(0.72)
in job by first
interview and
second interview
1.15
(0.30)
0.46
(0.59)
0.88
(0.24)
0.67
(0.20)
0.95
(0.76)
0.36
(0.42)
in job by first
interview but no
second interview
-1.00
(0.63)
-1.20
(1.09)
-1.15
(0.46)
-0.62
(0.30)
-32.8
(.)
-1.91
(1.05)
Log-Likelihood -1038.5
No. of obs 885
 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. For some categories there are no
values of some of the interview variables or they perfectly predict success.  The
failure to estimate the standard errors in these cases is denoted by a dot.
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FIGURE 1
Realised and Reservation Wages
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FIGURE 2
Changes in the Reservation Wage
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